

# Towards launching Randomized Controlled Trials in Europe

Presentation prepared for the workshop  
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Methodological challenges”  
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# Introduction

Fundamental difficulties in ex-post evaluation (of CAP) <sup>1</sup>:

- lack of appropriate control group (unbiased expected value)
- heterogenous effects (variance)
- Nonlinear effects
- temporal and spatial lags & general equilibrium effects
- CAP programs that comprise multiple interventions

My focus on **first point**, with some discussion of **second**.

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<sup>1</sup>based on Ferraro (2009)

# Expected value of treatment effect

Average effects of CAP program on the treated:

$$E(\widehat{ATT}) = \underbrace{E(y_1|D=1) - E(y_0|D=1)}_{\text{Average treatment effect on treated}} =$$

$$\underbrace{E(y|D=1) - E(y|D=0)}_{\text{Observed difference in average}} - \underbrace{E(y_0|D=1) - E(y_0|D=0)}_{\text{Selection bias}}$$

where  $y = y_0 + (y_1 - y_0)D$ .

- $y$  measure outcome (e.g. fertilizer utilization)
- $D = 1$  if farm is treated: compliance with agri-environment program mandatory

# Solutions to selection bias

Observational data:


- **Difference in Difference** combined with **Propensity Score Matching** i.e. Chabé-Ferret&Subervie (2013), Kirchweger et al. (2015)
- **Regression Discontinuity Design** . i.e Objective 1 Funds: eligible if  $\text{income} < 0.75$  of EU average (Becker et al, 2013)
- **Instrument variables** from the USA (Roberts and Bucholtz, 2005)

Experimental approaches:

- **Randomized controlled trials (RCT)**: On-farm-scale ecological models (Firbank et al., 2003). Raineau&Giraud-Héraud(2017)

## Example “Refrain from using silage”

- E.g.: Austrian agri-environment program **“Refrain from using silage”**
  - Hay produced instead of silage
  - Grass is cut later, more biodiversity
  - Farms eligible <sup>2</sup>:
    - if  $> 0.5$  livestock/ha: compensation 150 Euro/ha
  - 10.000 participants, 140.000 ha, 18 Mio Euro in 2009



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<sup>2</sup>simplified eligibility rule

# Observational Data

Evaluation with observational data:

$$\text{Outcome} = \frac{\text{hay}}{\text{hay} + \text{silage}}$$

- **Difference in Difference with PSM:** if pre-treatment observations and comparable non-participants are available .
- **Regression Discontinuity Design:** given the eligibility threshold at 0.5 livestock units/ha, we can apply.
- **Instrument Variable Regression:** no instrument available.

## Experimental approach

- RCT with random farms excluded from participation: acceptance in CAP still untested.


To increase acceptance of RCTs, “**Close to Random RCTs**” (Duflo et al., 2007; Shadish et al. 2002)

- **Pilot project, phase-in:** Randomize in which areas program is introduced first.
- **Over-subscription:** If applicants  $>$  budget allows: randomize who of applicants can participate.
- **Encouragement design:**
  - promote program among randomly selected farms
  - Use promotion intensity as instrument variable to estimate ATE
- “**Free-Lunch Randomization**” for Agri-Environment measures (Morawetz, 2014)

# “Free lunch” randomization

After deadline for application for agri-environment program:

- Eligible farms which applied for silage program
- Eligible farms which did not apply for silage programs
- non-eligible farms




Farms:  
● applying    ● non-applying    □ non-eligible



# "Free lunch" randomization

Randomly selected farms get a "free lunch" :

- get agri-environment payments (independent whether they applied)
- do not have to comply with the rules



Farms:

× Randomly selected

## “Free lunch” randomization

At end of period, calculate the **average treatment effect on the treated**

$$\underbrace{E(y_1|D = 1)}_{\text{applying, non "free lunch"}} - \underbrace{E(y_0|D = 1)}_{\text{applying, "free lunch"}}$$

- $D = 1$ : farms willing to participate in agri-environment program
- $y_1$ : outcome of farms that have to comply to the rules
- $y_0$ : outcome of farms which do not need to comply to the rules

Why include **non-applying** farms in randomization?

- Otherwise biased, because expected payment would depend on application.

## Demonstration Free Lunch Randomization

Who is willing to do a contract with me?

- Your part: you **accept the next review request** from a journal
- My part: I **pay you a chocolate ball now**

# Demonstration Free Lunch Randomization

Who is born in December?

- All December born are freed from having to accept the next review request
- All December born can keep the a chocolate ball
- If born in December, you get a chocolate ball, independent from a contract

In one year I will evaluate if chocolate balls had an effect:

- % “next review requests accepted” of those with contract **born January to November**
- minus
- % “next review requests accepted” of those with contract **born in December**

## Discussion “free lunch” randomization

### Advantages:

- Acceptance hopefully higher as nobody is excluded
- Estimate directly ATT
- Only minor change in CAP program necessary
- Applied among FADN participants to reduce survey costs

### Disadvantages:

- Effect of being a “free lunch” farm:
  - **applying farms**: “reciprocal obligation” (Corrigan and Rousu, 2006)
  - income effect
- Negative environmental effects in the short run

# Observational data or experiments?

Trade-off bias and variance in RCTs (Deaton and Cartwright, 2016).

Measure precision of  $\widehat{ATT}$  with Mean Squared Error (MSE) ):

$$MSE = E(\widehat{ATT} - ATT)^2 = Var(\widehat{ATT}) + bias(\widehat{ATT})^2$$

- RCT with small number of observations (e.g. 200):
  - $\widehat{ATT}$  unbiased, but possibly large variance
- Observational study with many observations (e.g. 10.000):
  - $\widehat{ATT}$  possibly biased but smaller variance.

# Conclusions

- Suitability of method depends on specific program
  - Pre-treatment and comparable non-treated observations available? DiD-PSM
  - Arbitrary threshold available? RDD
  - Instrument available? IV
  - Pilot, phase-in, over-subscription? Close to random RCT.
  - Ex-post evaluation of Agri-Environment Program? Free lunch randomization.
- Suitability depends on joint effort of program designers and evaluators:
  - collect pre-treatment observations
  - include arbitrary eligibility rules
  - run phase-in
  - apply “free lunch randomization”

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